Chapter 444: The Gap

In fact, the gap in combat effectiveness between the German and British armies was not as vast as the battle results might suggest. The British combat troops were, in fact, very skilled. The legacy of a century-old empire was a rich one, at least in terms of its considerable military strength.

In a simple comparison of infantry, the combat effectiveness of the two sides was definitely on par. The German army had an advantage in individual firepower and tactical innovation, while the British army excelled in artillery firepower and weapon range. The things that truly influenced the combat effectiveness of the two sides were the quality and application of their armored forces, as well as the level of air support.

The Germans’ invincible offensive was, in reality, a process where the air force would first destroy the enemy’s assembly areas and defensive lines. Then, the armored forces, with absolute superiority in both quantity and quality, would tear open the enemy’s positions, leaving the terrified and disoriented remnants for their own infantry to clean up.

This combat model relied on the close cooperation of multiple branches of the German army and air force, as well as the experience of various units at the local level. To put it bluntly, it was an asymmetrical firepower suppression tactic. They used air strikes and rapid armored assaults to compensate for their own weakness in artillery firepower, which was also the correct way to hide the shortfall in large-caliber artillery caused by Germany’s production constraints.

However, in the early stages of the landing in Britain, the German operational thinking was focused on transporting troops to the British mainland as quickly and in as large numbers as possible. This meant that the composition of the transport forces had to be calculated and analyzed with greater precision. The result of the analysis was that the armored forces, as the rapid assault element, had to be transported to Britain at the first opportunity, and to protect the beachhead, the number of infantry also had to reach army group level. As a result, some secondary equipment was reduced to a pitifully small amount.

Take motor vehicles, for example. Apart from some vehicles for the armored units to transport fuel, most of the German infantry had no transport vehicles at all, not even horses. General von Rundstedt’s army group headquarters had only about 20 vehicles, a scale even smaller than that of a second-rate infantry corps deployed in France.

Due to the lack of the motorized infantry that had allowed the Germans to roam freely on the battlefields of France, the Wehrmacht’s speed of movement became a rather serious problem that constrained their operations. In the face of Montgomery’s counter-attack at Norwich, the main reason for the sluggish reaction of Rundstedt’s Army Group A was that, apart from the armored forces, the deployment speed of their other units was indeed inferior to that of the British army fighting on its home turf.

Similarly, the large-caliber artillery units, which had never been given much importance, were placed in a lower priority due to their weight, volume, and astonishing consumption of ammunition. After all, with naval artillery support at the beachhead and aircraft to compensate inland, the importance of artillery could only be ignored.

Therefore, as of February 20th, Germany had only two regiments of 150mm artillery deployed in Britain as support units, and these two regiments lacked towing vehicles and shells, making their combat effectiveness very limited. The number of “Friedrich” rocket launchers was considerable, but because they expended ammunition too quickly and, being self-propelled, had high mobility, they became a cherished treasure that could not be used lightly, only at critical moments and in critical locations.

Therefore, the reason the British were able to launch counter-attacks at night, and even achieve some success as if they were using cheat codes, should now be clear to everyone. The German air force’s ground attack aircraft, which served as a supplement to the German artillery, could not be deployed to the battlefield at night. Thus, the long-concealed weakness in artillery was exposed, and relying on a firepower composition of 120mm mortars and 105mm howitzers to fight against the British, who had a large number of 140mm howitzers, the outcome was predictable.

The British artillery, which had been suppressed by the German air force during the day, could attack German positions with impunity at night. And at night, the German infantry could only compete with the British in the most vulnerable way—direct confrontation. To use one’s own weakness to fight the enemy’s strength was naturally a recipe for failure.

Another reason for the high German losses in Britain was the decline in the quality of the German attacking troops. In 1919, the German Reichswehr was reduced to 100,000 men. After continuous secret expansion by Akado, leading to a final explosive growth, the total number of the German Wehrmacht was still less than a million. By February 1938, the total number of the German Wehrmacht (including the SS) exceeded 5 million. Although one-third of them were not yet capable of fighting on the front lines, it was an indisputable fact that the elite force of 1 million had been tripled.

For example, everyone knows that the Wehrmacht’s 1st Division was originally trained as an armored unit, the old core of Guderian’s 1st Panzer Division. Later, due to the expansion of the army, it was split into three: one part became the 1st Panzer Division of the 1st Panzer Corps, one part became the Wehrmacht’s 1st Infantry Division, and the last part became Student’s 1st Paratrooper Division. Later, the Wehrmacht’s 1st Infantry Division was split again, becoming the 1st Infantry Division of Army Group A, which was now fighting in Britain, and the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, which was still in France.

Thus, the actual capability of the German army, hidden under the beautiful halo of invincibility, should now be clear to everyone, right? The so-called 5-million-strong German army was, in fact, full of water. The combat effectiveness of the troops guarding concentration camps in the rear was not much higher than that of the British “boy scouts,” and most of the rear-area soldiers were not even equipped with steel helmets, with gas masks being a luxury item.

So the German Army Group A under General von Rundstedt that landed in Britain was no longer the same Army Group A that had fought the grueling battle for France. In France, Rundstedt had had four panzer corps at his disposal—the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 7th—and almost one-third of his panzergrenadiers were true ace troops equipped with armored vehicles. Now, he only had two panzer corps, the 2nd and the 5th Light, and the only infantry unit that could be considered a mainline force was the 1st Infantry Division.

It is not difficult to understand why the Germans fought worse than the British at night, nor is it difficult to understand why the Germans were not as unstoppable as they had been in France. The towns in Britain were too dense, hindering the advance of the armored units. The infantry advanced too slowly, and lacking heavy weapons, they could only attack during the day. The combat proficiency of the troops had declined, and their overall combat performance was actually inferior to that of the French campaign. These all became important reasons for the brutal nature of the Battle of Britain.

It wasn’t just Akado; the German generals were also gambling. They were unwilling to throw their true mainline forces into the meat grinder of the British Isles. So, after supplementing their units with a large number of new recruits, they were willing to watch the high casualty figures, gritting their teeth and preparing to use the British rookies to train their own rookies. They firmly believed that after the brutal urban battles, the British battlefield would provide Germany with over 200,000 elite infantry familiar with urban warfare, which would be a great benefit to the German infantry, who lacked experience in siege warfare.

As for the delay in the operational timeline, it had long since ceased to be a problem. If Germany had delayed its landing in Britain, then time would have been on Britain’s side. But now that the British mainland had become a battlefield, time was no longer an issue.

Why? Because the German high command had calculated that the earliest the Americans could enter a state of war was mid-May, three months from now. Akado’s generals all predicted that the Battle of Britain would be over by mid-April. Even if the Americans rushed and entered the war early, the Battle of Britain would be mostly over by then. Even if the Americans tried to make trouble in the mountains of northern Britain, it would be meaningless.

So, in terms of time, Germany was now a little bit ahead. The German generals were willing to spend 15 days in Britain to temper their combat troops, because Germany did not have many battle-hardened units. The number of troops who had seen combat was about 1.9 million, and the number who had fought in grueling battles was less than 800,000, not as intimidating as the 5.5 million regular troops on paper.

And on this day, March 3rd, the German army once again repelled a symbolic British counter-attack at dawn. They had now captured Haverhill, Royston, and Braintree. On March 1st, they had captured Colchester and secured the important port city of Harwich. The German swastika flag was also raised over Clacton-on-Sea and Maldon.

The key was that on this day, the German army crossed the Great Ouse River, capturing March, Huntingdon, and Wisbech. Peterborough raised the white flag, and the remnants of the British VII Corps surrendered to the German army. A massive gap had appeared in the British central defensive line.

Germany, of course, would not let this opportunity pass. Corby, Stamford, and Leicester fell in succession. The northernmost German forces pushed all the way to the banks of the River Trent, just outside Nottingham, before finally halting their advance. In the west, the German army launched a fierce attack on Coventry. The British XII Reserve Corps fought a hasty engagement and was ultimately defeated, retreating towards Birmingham. On March 4th, Coventry fell into German hands. Subsequently, Northampton was captured, and the land link between London and Liverpool was hanging by a thread. The entire British resistance situation took a sharp turn for the worse, catching everyone off guard.

Just when Germany had prepared to fight a long and arduous battle, the British surrendered. What happened to fighting for every inch of ground? What happened to fighting to the death? Didn’t you give all the civilians hand grenades and prepare to go down in a blaze of glory? In the end, I drop my pants, and this is what you show me?

The surrender of the British forces in the central region had indeed brought disastrous consequences for the British defense plan. Stockpiled fuel, intact airfields, and hundreds of fighter planes were handed over to the German enemy, and even 100 M3 tanks that had just been issued to the VII Corps. Of course, what made the Germans happiest of all were the 90 intact 140mm howitzers.

Published: 2025-08-25T04:13:36.000+00:00
Last Edited: 2025-11-11T13:57:13.000+00:00
URL: https://www.patreon.com/caleredhair/posts/mtr-c444-gap-137276339

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